The terrible news just in that at least 132 people have been killed in a series of car bombs in Shia districts of Baghdad. Greater or lesser atrocities such as this are now happening on a daily basis.

What is now happening in Iraq underlines the political inadequacy of the positions the main camps on the left adopted over the conflict three years ago.

It is increasingly obvious that both the pro-war left – remember their visions of a grateful Iraqi people strewing the path of US troops with flowers? – and the ‘Victory to the Resistance!’ brigade have gotten things completely wrong. Not that either can bring themselves to admit it, of course.

The project that movitated the invasion has clearly failed, albeit in ways I don’t think anybody anticipated at the time. It has created a crisis without any obvious solution.

The inability of the occupation troops to achieve order in Iraq underlines that the power to destroy is not the same as the power to create. The occupiers cannot build a state in Iraq, because they have no legitimacy.

Iraq’s weak government can claim to issue from a broadly democratic election, however warped the process was a result of being held against the backdrop of an occupation.

But inevitably it also lacks legitimacy, largely because the very concept of ‘Iraq’ itself lacks legitimacy, or even logic. It is an imperialist construct, which has existed for just 80 years of Mesopotamia’s 8,000-year history.

The Kurds want their own homeland, the oil-rich Shias look to Iran. The Sunnis have neither oil nor a majority, just guns and a willingness to use them.

One idea doing the rounds in foreign policy circles is some loose federal framework, with everything open to negotiation: the division of oil, water, and access to the sea.

Superficially, it seems an attractive proposition. But it runs up against many of the problems experienced in the partition of Ireland or of India and Pakistan.

The distribution of populations does not correspond to neat lines on a map. Even more bloodshed would inevitably ensue.

The move would also be unpopular in the Middle East. Many Arabs would regard it as Zionist plot to fragment Iraq for Israel’s benefit.

And there is no way the US would countenance the creation of a Sunni-dominated de facto Al Qa’eda statelet.

So the slaughter looks set to continue for years, whether the occupation forces remain or not.

I opposed the war in 2003. Nothing that has happened in the intervening period has given me reason to reconsider that opposition.

And given that it was a mistake to wage the war in the first place, rapid withdrawal of occupation troops seems the least worst option.

They call it the ‘surge strategy’. George Bush is widely expected to announce on Wednesday that at least 10,000 – and possibly more - more US troops will be sent to Iraq, on top of the 132,000 already in place. What on earth can he be thinking of?

On the face of it, the move is a political and military no-brainer. If all this is about being seen to play hardball, the numbers being talked about are simply not enough.

According to most analysts, the US simply does not have enough spare soldiers to pacify the multi-faceted Iraqi insurgency, especially if it wants to maintain some in reserve for such other crises as may emerge this year. A deployment of 10,000-20,000 is a ‘surge’ in name alone.

An interesting article from stratfor.com suggests that what Bush is probably seeking to achieve is control of Baghdad, in the hope that this would boost his chances of securing a nationwide settlement. But that is something of a long shot.

Stratfor speculates that Bush might deliberately be seeking to act in a counter-intuitive fashion, both to underline that he still calls the shots on US foreign policy despite the Democrat’s successes last November, and make the point to Tehran that they cannot bank on a precipitate withdrawal.

But there has been plenty of military criticism of the surge strategy, not least from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is well aware that the additional forces will not be enough successful to undertake the mission at hand.

They are worried about morale and retention, even the efficacy of continually extended tours of duty. The odds on success are simply too great.

These latest developments underline that the power to destroy is not the same as the power to create. The occupying forces cannot build a state in Iraq, because they themselves have no legitimacy.

What happened to Dick Cheney’s prediction that US troops would be hailed as liberators, or Kanan Makiya’s confident assertion that they would be welcomed with sweets and flowers?

Luckily for them, the neocons and the pro-war left do not have to live with the consequences of the actions they urged. It is the Iraqi people that have to do that.

For all the talk of a surge strategy, it is time for the hard-headed recognition on the part of the US and British ruling classes that the war in Iraq has been lost. The only viable course now is withdrawal.

The Tories are pressing for an inquiry into the Iraq war. The Tories are right to press for an inquiry into the Iraq war. Hypocritical, given their historic complicity in arming the Saddam regime and their parliamentary support for the venture in the crucial vote. But nevertheless, correct on the narrow issue at hand.

If ever there was a conflict centrally premised on lies, it is the 2003 invasion of Iraq. And we are not just talking about non-existent WMDs. Remember the ‘dodgy dossier’, the forged Iraq-Niger uranium documents, faked correspondence designed to stitch up a British MP, the UN oil-for-food scam allegations, the Jessica Ryan rescue and the commander-in-chief’s plastic thanksgiving turkey?

Not only was it launched on the basis of gross misrepresentation, it was incompetently planned and it remains severely under-resourced. Its results have been not liberation but widespread torture and the imposition of neo-liberal economics at gunpoint in a country that has descended into civil war.

The US-led aggression – unlike Vietnam, or even Kosovo or Afghanistan – could not even pretend spuriously to be an exercise in containment. It was not intended to restore any status quo, but to create something never seen in Iraq before. It formed part of a wider US drive to reshape the entire Middle East that now lies in ruins around the feet of its neoconservative instigators.

Some things are true even if William Hague says they are true. Yes, we need an inquiry, not least to ensure that nothing like this ever happens again.

Very few things about Iraq can legitimately be described as clear; but one proposition of which there can be little doubt is that the project that motivated the invasion of 2003 has failed, albeit in ways its framers did not anticipate at the time. The result is a crisis without obvious solution.

Unlike Vietnam, or even perhaps Kosova or Afghanistan, what happened in Iraq was not an exercise in containment. It was gratuitous, aggressive, unprovoked. As part of a US drive to reshape the Middle East, it was not intended to restore any status quo, but to create something never seen before.

The neocons shaping US foreign policy believed – perhaps genuinely - that Iraq would strew flowers in the path of Chalabi or some other Washington-endorsed pro-US/pro-Israel free marketeer as some kind of ersatz de Gaulle, sparking off a democratic domino effect in a number of Middle Eastern countries. They have been proven wrong, but cannot even acknowledge their failure, let alone take responsibility for the consequences.

The inability of the US army to achieve order underlines that the power to destroy is not the same as the power to create. The occupiers cannot build a state in Iraq, because they lack the legitimacy and because they are forced systematically to exclude the only forces with sufficient popular support to be capable of state-building.

In terms of an ostensible impact on terrorism, the result has been an own goal of staggering proportions. I cannot improve on this formulation from Francis Fukuyama:

'By invading Iraq, the Bush administration created a self-fulfilling prophecy: Iraq has now replaced Afghanistan as a magnet, training ground, and operational base for jihadist terrorists, with plenty of American targets to shoot at.'

I opposed the war in 2003. Nothing that has happened in the intervening period has given me reason to reconsider that stance. War is an ultimate act that should never be engaged in lightly, or for motives that are base, materialistic and imperialist.

The USA’s failure means that the slaughter looks set to continue for years, whether the occupation forces remain or not. And given that it was a mistake to send in the troops in the first place, their immediate withdrawal now seems the least worst option.

THE most sensible time to ponder reasons for going to war is surely prior to the commencement of hostilities, and not six years after the fighting finishes. Whatever the outcome of Sir John Chilcot’s inquiry into the whys are wherefores of the occupation of Iraq, the entire exercise can only ever be about as useful as an investigation into world war two might have proved, if staged circa 1951.

Yet in a way, these proceedings could almost have been modelled on the pattern of the events which they will consider in detail. There is now a large body of direct testimony that the Bush White House had already taken the decision to topple Saddam as early as 2001. All the subsequent excuses were simply bolted on, after the fact. Why not the exoneration, too?

In logic alone, it must be unfair to Sir John Chilcot, and his handpicked team of three other Sirs and a Baroness, to write off the committee’s deliberations as a snow job before the deliberations have even taken placed. In the best traditions of Tricky Dickie, Sir John has promised that there will be no whitewash. He must be given every chance to live up to his word.

But it has to be said that the precedents – which include the Hutton inquiry into the death of David Kelly, the Butler inquiry into what are euphemistically referred to as ‘intelligence failures’, and two inquiries by House of Commons committees – do not predispose anyone to expect a hard-hitting indictment of Blair’s actions. At the very least, the hearings should have been held in public.

When the Chilcot report is published in next year, it will be judged by how frankly (or otherwise) it answers the questions that need to be answered.

If it fails to outline exactly what intelligence was available, does not come to a position on whether that intelligence was systematically distorted, neglects to detail the extent and nature of the pressure applied by Washington on London, and does not specify in full the legal advice proffered to Blair, it will lack any credibility.

NOW the Chilcot Inquiry is in full swing, cast your mind back to the Hutton Inquiry into the suicide of Dr David Kelly in 2003. Remember that day six years ago, when BBC Radio 4’s defence correspondent was subjected to a four hours and eleven minutes of hostile interrogation from James Dingemans QC?

Andrew Gilligan’s crime had been to base a radio piece for the Today Programme on an interview with Kelly at a London hotel in May that year, in which the former UN weapons inspector questioned a key assertion contained in a government dossier in support of its intention to invade Iraq.

Downing Street stood accused of ‘sexing up’ the document with the contention that Saddam Hussein could launch a chemical and biological attack within 45 minutes, despite knowing that the claim was based on an unreliable single informant. In a subsequent newspaper article, Gilligan named Tony Blair’s personal PR man Alastair Campbell as the man responsible for the move.

New Labour hounded the BBC to name the source for Gilligan's report; the BBC rightly refused. In the event, Kelly revealed to his employers that he had spoken to Gilligan. Events moved on rapidly after that.

At around this time, Campbell wrote in his diary: 'It would fuck Gilligan if that was his source.' And Campbell made sure his quarry was well and truly fucked, ensuring the Ministry of Defence press office all but leaked Kelly’s name to the media.

Gilligan - a man who is admittedly a bit of a maverick, even by the standards of the trade - found himself pilloried by Dingemans as a sloppy journalist. At issue became not the government’s reliance on single sources, but his.

Editors in newsrooms across the country held him up as a by-word for lack of professionalism when bollocking junior reporters for not double-checking facts. After a decent-ish interval, Gilligan got the sack from the BBC. He has worked since, but has not enjoyed the prominence his talents undoubtedly deserve.

And Kelly? On July 17, Kelly told his wife he was going out for a walk in an area of woodlands near his home known as Harrowdown Hill, where he swallowed 29 co-proxamol tablets and then slit his left wrist.

Fast forward to 2009, and Britain is holding yet another inquiry – at least the fifth, on my count – into how it is we find ourselves till trapped in Iraq. Yesterday it was the turn of Tory MP and defence specialist Adam Holloway to testify. MI6, it transpires, learned of Saddam’s 45-minute capability from – get this - a taxi driver who had two Iraqi military officials in the back of his cab once. Or to more exact, the intelligence came from a bloke who heard it from a taxi driver who had overhead two other blokes some time ago.

'[MI6] were running a senior Iraqi army officer who had a source of his own, a cab driver on the Iraqi-Jordanian border," said Holloway, a former Grenadier Guardsman and television journalist. "He apparently overheard two Iraqi army officers two years before who had spoken about weapons with the range to hit targets elsewhere in the Middle East.'

In other words, Kelly was right all along. What’s more, it’s not even as if the mouthy cabbie’s info has since been verified. An apology from Campbell to Gilligan is probably too much to ask for. An apology from Campbell to Kelly would be too bloody late.

IT SEEMS nobody is quite sure how many people died in the five bombings that took place in Baghdad yesterday. The body count is 127 and set to climb, say some reports. Most newspapers seem to go with the figure of 112, while reports just breaking say the authorities have revised the estimate down to 77. But whatever the final tally, it’s a lot of corpses.

And on the same day the multiple explosions were detonating in the Iraqi capital, a former army officer was testifying the Chilcot Inquiry that he had told Tony Blair, prior to the invasion of 2003, that Britain was unprepared to deal with security in that country after the fighting was finished There’s synchronicity for you.

Major General Tim Cross said just two days before the troops went in, he warned the then prime minister of a lack of preparation for what could reasonably have been expected to come.

"I do remember saying, in so many words: I have no doubt at all that we will win this military campaign. I do not believe that we are ready for post-war Iraq," he said. “He [Blair] nodded and didn't say anything particularly, but I'm sure he understood what I was saying."

"Considering the expected scale of the humanitarian suffering, the projected numbers of civilian casualties etc., this was, once again, more than a little disappointing.”

Yes, I guess it was more than a little disappointing for dozens of Iraqi families that will have lost loved ones on Tuesday. Nothing quite beats good old upper class understatement, does it?

By contrast, it takes a considerable feat of overstatement for opponents of the war simplistically to maintain - as some doubtlessly will - that the killings are directly attributable to the British government. Logically, authorship and thus moral culpability rests with the perpetrators, thought likely to have been al Qa’eda in Iraq.

They committed those murders, and today followed those murders up with more murders, in a process apparently designed to disrupt an auction of the country’s oil reserves, due to take place on Friday and Saturday, and influence the climate ahead of parliamentary elections in March. Nobody rational should wish to proclaim their solidarity with people capable of such brutality.

Yet it also remains the case that what happened would not have happened without the invasion of 2003, that such events should have been foreseen, that Blair was warned that they would occur, and then nodded and didn’t say anything. And that is more than a little disappointing. I am sure you will understand what I am saying.