World war two and the socialist project today
HITLER started it. Personally. That – with only slight exaggeration – is what eight year olds are still being taught at school about the origins of the second world war, as I have discovered from conversations with Daddy’s Little Princess senior.
OK, you have got to simplify things for kids. At her age, I’m happy enough to see the girl reading JK Rowling; AJP Taylor can wait. Now is not the time to walk her through contending interpretations, which range from blaming everything on the aggressive expansionism of Nazi Germany to the thesis that world war two was essentially the continuation of world war one.
But of course, other eight years olds in other European countries are being offered entirely different explanations. This is especially the case in eastern Europe, where the conflict still has a resonance far in excess of that to be found here.
In the Baltic States and Poland, in particular, Soviet dictator Stalin is held as much to blame as his Nazi counterpart. They point to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939, as a carve-up that implicates the USSR as much as Germany.
Earlier this year, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe passed a resolution recommending that 23 August, the date the pact was signed, be observed as a day of remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.
Such a position might as well have been purposely calculated to cause apoplexy in Moscow, where world war two is known as the Great Patriotic War, on the understandable basis that the eastern front was the location of one-third of the 70m deaths arising from the global hostilities.
While the claim that the USSR should take most credit for the military defeat of the Third Reich chimes with the nationalist agenda regnant in the Kremlin, it has sufficient accord with the truth to represent more than propaganda. On any fair reading of history, the contention is true.
Moreover, the experience of Britain’s wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was a seminal event for the UK left. The Communist Party of Great Britain, despite the twists and turns it had to go through every step of the way, and despite its shameful strikebreaking role, saw its membership jump from single-figure thousands to perhaps 60,000 on the back of the reflected prestige.
I can still remember discussions with that generation, who continued to be actively involved in the east London labour movement when I arrived on the political scene in the early 1980s. Vicarious pride in the achievement of ‘their Red Army comrades’ clearly sustained a lifetime of political commitment for many of them.
That just leaves the need to explain away the shabby and cynical little deal concluded by two certain foreign ministers way back when.
Those sympathetic to Russia routinely compare the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact to another shabby and cynical little deal struck in Munich the previous year, in which Chamberlain and Daladier agreed to let Hitler detach Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.
Morally, it is difficult to maintain equivalence. It’s not as if Britain and France said ‘alright then, Adolf, if you must. Bagsy Carpathian Ruthenia and we’ll shake on it.’ The case that both were essentially attempts to play for time, at whatever expense to other peoples, probably bears more scrutiny.
But evidence suggests that rather than using the period that followed the Ribbentrop-Molotov to enhance war preparations, Stalin was actually surprised when the Nazi tanks rolled into his turf.
All that is for the historians. Ideologically, the importance of the OSCE’s call is the explicit attempt to draw an ‘equals’ sign between fascism and Stalinism. At the analytical level, the anti-Stalinist left can make the case that the social content of the two systems was qualitatively different, but we should always be mindful of the quantitative similarities. On balance, lesser evilism dictated critical support for the USSR.
But ultimately, it is not our job retrospectively to defend Soviet foreign policy seven decades after the event, and nor is it our job to specify what commemorative events are appropriate for countries with varying historical experiences.
As historical experience of Stalinism renders plain, repudiation of its legacy is a sine qua non for the rehabilitation of any meaningful Marxist project today.
HITLER started it. Personally. That – with only slight exaggeration – is what eight year olds are still being taught at school about the origins of the second world war, as I have discovered from conversations with Daddy’s Little Princess senior.
OK, you have got to simplify things for kids. At her age, I’m happy enough to see the girl reading JK Rowling; AJP Taylor can wait. Now is not the time to walk her through contending interpretations, which range from blaming everything on the aggressive expansionism of Nazi Germany to the thesis that world war two was essentially the continuation of world war one.
But of course, other eight years olds in other European countries are being offered entirely different explanations. This is especially the case in eastern Europe, where the conflict still has a resonance far in excess of that to be found here.
In the Baltic States and Poland, in particular, Soviet dictator Stalin is held as much to blame as his Nazi counterpart. They point to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939, as a carve-up that implicates the USSR as much as Germany.
Earlier this year, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe passed a resolution recommending that 23 August, the date the pact was signed, be observed as a day of remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.
Such a position might as well have been purposely calculated to cause apoplexy in Moscow, where world war two is known as the Great Patriotic War, on the understandable basis that the eastern front was the location of one-third of the 70m deaths arising from the global hostilities.
While the claim that the USSR should take most credit for the military defeat of the Third Reich chimes with the nationalist agenda regnant in the Kremlin, it has sufficient accord with the truth to represent more than propaganda. On any fair reading of history, the contention is true.
Moreover, the experience of Britain’s wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was a seminal event for the UK left. The Communist Party of Great Britain, despite the twists and turns it had to go through every step of the way, and despite its shameful strikebreaking role, saw its membership jump from single-figure thousands to perhaps 60,000 on the back of the reflected prestige.
I can still remember discussions with that generation, who continued to be actively involved in the east London labour movement when I arrived on the political scene in the early 1980s. Vicarious pride in the achievement of ‘their Red Army comrades’ clearly sustained a lifetime of political commitment for many of them.
That just leaves the need to explain away the shabby and cynical little deal concluded by two certain foreign ministers way back when.
Those sympathetic to Russia routinely compare the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact to another shabby and cynical little deal struck in Munich the previous year, in which Chamberlain and Daladier agreed to let Hitler detach Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.
Morally, it is difficult to maintain equivalence. It’s not as if Britain and France said ‘alright then, Adolf, if you must. Bagsy Carpathian Ruthenia and we’ll shake on it.’ The case that both were essentially attempts to play for time, at whatever expense to other peoples, probably bears more scrutiny.
But evidence suggests that rather than using the period that followed the Ribbentrop-Molotov to enhance war preparations, Stalin was actually surprised when the Nazi tanks rolled into his turf.
All that is for the historians. Ideologically, the importance of the OSCE’s call is the explicit attempt to draw an ‘equals’ sign between fascism and Stalinism. At the analytical level, the anti-Stalinist left can make the case that the social content of the two systems was qualitatively different, but we should always be mindful of the quantitative similarities. On balance, lesser evilism dictated critical support for the USSR.
But ultimately, it is not our job retrospectively to defend Soviet foreign policy seven decades after the event, and nor is it our job to specify what commemorative events are appropriate for countries with varying historical experiences.
As historical experience of Stalinism renders plain, repudiation of its legacy is a sine qua non for the rehabilitation of any meaningful Marxist project today.
