NOT even people who live in Egypt – and I’ve spoken to several ex-pats this morning, now that mobile phone communications have been restored – seem certain about what will happen there next.

So let’s avoid the leftist parlour game of attempting to shoehorn all social upheavals into the model of the classic class struggles of the twentieth century, and try to develop some sense of the possibilities. Plainly the current stand-off cannot last indefinitely, and will resolve itself one way or another in the days ahead.

What we have so far is, by common consent, a cross-class ‘people power’ uprising in which liberalism has been the dominant note. The calls have been for democracy in the abstract, without a specified class or religious content.

Hosni Mubarak’s gamble in appointing secret policeman Omar Suleiman as vice president has failed to satisfy the clamour for change. Nor have his job creation and food subsidy promises convinced many in a country where half the population of 80m or so live on less than $2 a day.

Unions have declared a general strike tomorrow, and the expectation is that the stoppage will be widely heeded. We know that there is an active Egyptian far left, and Tuesday will presumably provide a pointer to the extent of its clout. The labour movement deserves our solidarity.

Popular self-organisation has so far most been on display in other sections of civil society, although community councils in which investment bankers play a leading role are something of twist hitherto unanticipated by revolutionary theory.

Washington has turned its back on Mubarak, which will be another setback for Egypt’s authoritarian ruler. However, the West would clearly prefer orderly transition to popular revolt. That must deal Mohamed ElBaradei – who counts on the domestic backing of both liberals and the Muslim Brotherhood – a notably strong hand.

Much now hinges on how the armed forces respond. While on the one hand there are reports of extensive fraternisation between civilians and soldiers, the fighter jets buzzing Tahrir Square and the columns of tanks controlling access to the landmark show that things could go the other way, too.

There is also the de Gaulle scenario. I have read reports that Mubarak does have a social base outside the cities, which could yet be mobilised in his support if only he can hold the fort in the days ahead, just as the French president was able to draw on the rural areas to win an election only one month after May 1968.

Thanks to everybody who is contributing to the high quality of the debate in the post below. Your thoughts on the hasty observations above – which are, of course, purely by way of thinking out loud and with no claim to special authority – are equally welcome.